Opções Trading Seattle

Esta cúpula abordará os mais recentes desafios comerciais e tecnológicos que afetam o lado da compra em um cenário financeiro e regulatório em constante mudança, bem como estratégias inovadoras para otimizar a execução comercial, gerenciando riscos e aumentando a eficiência operacional, mantendo os custos ao mínimo. WatersTechnology e Sell-Side Technology têm o prazer de apresentar a 7ª Cúpula anual de arquitetura comercial da América do Norte. Reunindo tecnólogos, arquitetos, desenvolvedores de software e gerentes de centros de dados da comunidade financeira para discutir as últimas questões em tecnologia de negociação. Data: 05 de abril de 2017 New York Marriott Marquis, Nova York Tokyo Financial Information Technology Summit Waters TechnologyThe EUA O Mariner não está de forma alguma afiliado, tolerado ou dado qualquer aviso pela equipe de beisebol Seattle Mariners, que tem seu próprio site. Da mesma forma, não temos associação com o grupo de propriedade ou com quaisquer empresas relacionadas aos Marineros. Todo o texto do artigo é escrito pelos autores, todas as imagens são tomadas pelos autores, que retem direitos autorais de suas obras. Não é autorizada qualquer cópia ou reprodução de qualquer conteúdo aqui, fotográfico ou não. Por favor, envie-nos um e-mail se desejar reproduzir nosso trabalho. Marc w middot 6 de janeiro de 2017 middot Arquivado sob Mariners Depois de criar uma abertura para um pelotão OF, os M8217 preencheram essa posição rapidamente negociando pelo ex-Royals CF Jarrod Dyson. Dyson8217s foi um dos melhores defensores da liga8217s, mas ele não é um grande atacante, já que ele conseguiu muito pouco poder e sérios problemas de pelotão que o limitaram ao dever de meio período em KC. O custo: Nate Karns, uma das poucas opções de SP em Seattle, que teve algum potencial positivo. Depois de uma temporada inconsistente e problemas de lesões (ele estava no DL de 60 dias no ano passado), eu posso entender o desejo do M8217 de seguir em frente, mas isso parece vender muito baixo. Dyson está saindo de uma temporada de 3 fWAR de acordo com Fangraphs, mas também com 32. Como resultado, Karns deverá ser mais valioso em 2017, apesar das preocupações com lesões. Mais problemático é como implantar o Dyson em uma formação que já tem um defensor sólido em CF, Leonys Martin. Um pelotão talvez Bem, Dyson e Martin são dois bastões canhotos (que jogam descaradamente, estranhamente), para que isso não funcione. Colocar Dyson (ou Martin) em uma esquina saps seu valor. Com um OF agora de Guillermo Heredia, Mitch Haniger, Martin, e agora Dyson, os M8217s têm quatro potenciais CFs. Apesar de terem mais atletismo em 2016, os M8217s ainda eram uma defensiva desastrosa da unidade 8211 27,9 é pior do que a média por UZR e 22 corre pior do que a média pelo DRS. Levantar-se para a média ou melhor é uma ótima maneira, principalmente escondida, de adicionar alguma produção, mas, novamente, todos os jogadores que colocaram as temporadas da liga média ou melhores no ano passado estão agora desaparecidos. It8217s não é tão útil para ganhar 25 corridas em defesa, se você apenas derrubar novamente na placa. Dyson também adiciona valor nos caminhos de base, outra área com a qual os M8217s lutaram com o ano passado. He8217s se tornam um melhor e melhor lançador também, em grande parte ao fazer mais contato 8211 sua taxa de 11 K no ano passado ficou em 27º lugar entre os 353 jogadores com pelo menos 200 PAs em 2016. Sua velocidade o ajuda a publicar BABIPs consistentemente decentes, apesar de não bater na bola Muito difícil. Tudo o que disse, ele se tornou algo como um jogador ofensivo médio, o que, combinado com sua defesa, é bastante útil, especialmente devido à relativa pessança que ele ganha em salário. Ainda assim, he8217s 32, e completará 33 anos antes do 20178217s. É difícil assumir que sua linha de tendência de bando continue escalando, especialmente em uma época em que as lesões se tornam um pouco mais comuns que perdeu seis semanas com uma tensão oblíqua no ano passado. Mais preocupante é a autoridade da bola bateada. Em 2015, a velocidade de saída média de Dyson8217s foi a 3ª menor em MLB de acordo com Statcast. Em 2016, foi apenas um pouco melhor, mas ainda o classificou para ouvir o fundo com Ichiro, Billy Hamilton e um grupo de caras que tinham sido DFA8217d (Max Muncy, JB Shuck). Statcast ainda é tão novo, é difícil saber o que fazer das novas métricas e, apesar de sua simplicidade, a velocidade de saída média não deve contar toda a história com alguns bateadores. Mas é uma medida bastante limpa e, com preocupação, pode realmente superar a autoridade de Dyson8217s. Muitas bolas foram realmente rastreadas por Statcast, aqueles que são atingidos extremamente suavemente ou surgiram são muitas vezes perdidos pelo sistema. Isso não seria um problema se Dyson apenas atingisse uma tonelada de grounders, mas ele agora atinge mais bolas de bola de infield do que a média. Jeff Zimmermann adiciona velocidades de saída médias para os tipos de bola batida que Statcast falha, e apresenta 8220 velocidades de saída corrigidas 8221. Isso empurra a média de Dyson8217s, e isso mostra que a leve melhora na autoridade de 2015 a 2016 pode ser uma ilusão 8211, todos esses pop-ups significam que o Dyson8217s EV pode ter realmente recusado. Uma maneira de implantar o Dyson de forma otimizada como uma maneira de extrair o valor máximo de sua velocidade e luva excepcional, minimizando sua exposição aos jarros canhotos. I8217m simplesmente não tenho certeza de que os M8217s estão bem posicionados para fazê-lo. Ele pode facilmente atuar com Martin ou Ben Gamel, e enquanto Mitch Haniger atingiu os esquerdistas muito melhor nos menores de idade, parece um desperdício para levar os morcegos dele em 2017. Isso deixa Guillermo Heredia, que viu a maior parte do tempo de sua grande liga Em LF. Conseguir que Jarrod Dyson seja um pelotão LF parece-me sub-ótimo. Isso é uma grande negatividade em torno de um comércio que envolve um jogador de 3 vencedores, que fará 2,5 milhões no ano que vem. Aliás, algumas vantagens reais em Dyson man8217s comprovou que ele pode adicionar melhor-do que a média-produção média em tempo parcial, o que não é nada pequeno. Mas, por vários motivos, eu estava muito alto em Nate Karns 8211, quem recorda, ainda é um jogador pré-arb. Dito isto, Karns não criou muito bem e sofreu uma séria lesão no segundo lugar em uma curta carreira da MLB. Seja o que for que causou a equipe de treinadores do M8217 agar no cara (lembre-se, ele foi rebaixado para o bullpen e simplesmente não usado por um tempo) pode ter sido um fator aqui, e talvez o M8217 saiba algumas coisas que mudariam minha visão Deste movimento. Eu sei que os M8217s eram finos em AMBOS e SP, mas esse par de trades não adiciona muito valor à rotação ao substituir o seu morcego mais consistente por um primeiro jogador de luvas sem o primeiro lugar de luva para jogar. Jerry Dipoto8217s aparentemente disse a Bob Dutton que isso é essencialmente até a adição de jogadores de posição, então, uh, salve-nos, Mitch Haniger. Por meio das projeções de Steamer, os M8217 acabaram de perder uma vitória de KarnsSeth Smith para GallardoDyson. Por ZiPS, isso não é tão ruim, mas ainda é difícil ver exatamente como os M8217 são melhores como resultado dos dois negócios que eles fizeram hoje. Marc w middot 6 de janeiro de 2017 middot Arquivado sob Mariners Como conversamos sobre a última vez, o M8217s parecia ser uma equipe com uma gama excepcionalmente ampla de possíveis resultados em 2017. Muitos dos jogadores com os quais they8217re contando são antigos, voláteis ou não testados . Há algumas maneiras de lidar com isso: o clube poderia alavancar suas perspectivas e até mesmo jovens talentos (Leia: Edwin Diaz) para trazer uma força estabilizadora para o roteamento e fechar a lacuna com os Astros, OU eles poderiam Diga 8220screw it8221 e fique ainda mais volátil. Ao negociar Seth Smith para Yovani Gallardo. Eles claramente, inequivocamente, optaram pela última estratégia. Como mencionado aqui, e por muitas outras pessoas, nenhum dos mistérios sobre o ponto fraco na formação dos M8217s: o segundo plano. Leonys Martin caiu toda a segunda metade de 2016 e he8217s flanqueados por perspectivas não testadas como Guillermo Heredia, Ben Gamel e Mitch Haniger. Antes de hoje, o M8217 tinha todo um jogador jogando principalmente DE, que projetou ser um bateador médio da liga. Agora, eles não têm nenhum. Agora, para Jerry Dipoto, isso pode não importar, já que os sistemas de projeção serão baixos no canto jovem M8217s, dado que todos eles atingiram mal em breves períodos no ano passado. Dada a escassez de PAs da grande liga para GamelHerediaHaniger, isso significa apenas que os sistemas vomitam as mãos, regredam um pouco para a média da liga (e para as equivalências da liga menor) e chamam-no de bom. A frente do M8217s claramente acredita em pessoas como Gamel e Vogelbach, e eles fizeram tudo o que podem para esclarecer os decks para eles. Os M8217s removeram os planos de contingência pelo menos, as crianças terão que bater em jarros de mãos opostas e bater neles com força. Os M8217s estão bancando sua capacidade de desenvolver e ensinar jovens jogadores, e depois do ano passado, isso pode não ser uma má aposta. Claro, é uma coisa a se concentrar em instrução em menores de idade, e outra para bancar suas esperanças de playoffs sobre isso, especialmente considerando que este pode ser o último tiro realista em um tempo. O front office do M8217s é chamado de tiro com GamelHaniger, e agora que Seth Smith vai se adequar a Baltimore, é melhor que tenham razão. Em geral, o quid pro quo com um movimento como este é que você ganha alguma vantagem com sua volatilidade. Claro, Jean Segura8217s é muito difícil de imaginar que o 8282 ele passou de Ketel Marte-in-2016 para uma estação de 5 WAR 71211, mas o potencial positivo é cristalino. Os M8217s poderiam ter uma estrela sempre viva. A coisa decepcionante sobre esse movimento é que não há nada disso. Isso aumenta a volatilidade apenas removendo um performer bastante consistente das opções OF que não adicionou a vantagem, porque o HanigerGamel já estava aqui antes que essa jogada fosse feita. Doesn8217t Gallardo adiciona errado, na verdade, não. I8217ve falou muito sobre Yovani Gallardo, especialmente em 2015. Quando ele se mudou dos Brewers para o Texas e ajudou a ancorar uma rotação empobrecida. Ele surgiu em 2007 depois de arrancar o PCL (ao mesmo tempo que Tim Lincecum estava fazendo o mesmo), e fez algumas equipes All-Star em Milwaukee com uma bola rápida reta, de quatro costura e uma bola curva grande. Ao longo do tempo, ele adicionou uma platéia ao seu repertório, e confiou mais em um controle deslizante do que sua curva. Com uma velocidade e uma curva crescentes, you8217d espera que ele execute taxas de GB no intervalo de 30-40, bem junto com, digamos, Chris Tillman. Mas ao longo do tempo, Gallardo gradualmente evoluiu para um lançador de bola de chão. Claro, o chato ajudou, mas mesmo agora, ele o joga menos do que a sua quatro costura. Em vez disso, ele aprendeu a obter mais e mais bases de suas bolas de ruptura. Seu slider não é muito para escrever em casa, tanto quanto os golpes de balanço, mas ocasionalmente são bons para um grounder. Sua curva tinha sido mais consistente um passo de bola de terra, o que poderia ser útil se o Safeco Field8217 fosse tão feliz como fosse o ano passado. Gallardo foi bem sucedido no Texas em 2015 em parte por causa de sua taxa de GB e, em parte, devido a uma taxa de vertente elevada. Aquele último bit grita fluke, mas Gallardo8217s foi consistentemente bom em corredores estranhos, e esse foi o principal motivo pelo qual ele conseguiu um pouco melhor do que o seu FIP no Texas e no último ano com os Brewers. Infelizmente, nada funcionou para ele em Baltimore. Ele foi ferido parte do ano, e sua velocidade de FB baixou para 87 no início do ano passado. Sua porcentagem de GB despencou e as baterias não foram atingidas por mais bolas de bola 8211 que as atingiam com mais força. Gallardo tem sido muito bom em obter um contato médio a pouco abaixo da média em bolas molhadas. Mas a autoridade de contato da bola da mosca subiu no ano passado. Talvez, sem surpresa, tenha dado tudo isso, a taxa de sua vertente também entrou em colapso, levando a um ERA que não só era bem mais de 5, mas também ao seu (mau) FIP. Sua taxa de K tinha diminuído há anos, mas ele conseguiu encontrar um pouco de sucesso no Texas, apesar disso, e apesar de uma proporção medíocre de K: BB, porque ele conseguiu contato. No ano passado, ele não conseguiu. Os arcos que tradicionalmente usavam para obter grounders produziram bolas de moscas em vez disso, e lesões também o perseguiram. Para ser justo, ele parecia melhor no trecho, já que sua velocidade de FB estava em média 91 novamente em setembro. Mas os M8217s adquiriram um direito direto ao contato que passou o tempo no DL no ano passado por dor no ombro, e quem estava passando o pior ano. Essa lesão no ombro ainda não era um acaso: a equipe médica de Orioles encontrou um problema com seu ombro quando eles deram a Gallardo seu físico. Isso fez com que os Orioles voltassem a trabalhar no contrato que ele tinha acordado em 8211, passou de 335M garantido para 222 com uma opção de equipe. Em outras palavras, há muito pouca vantagem em Gallardo. O melhor caso, o M8217s pensa que o deslizamento de Gallardo8217s em GB foi devido à mistura e abordagem do passo, e não à falta de comando por dor crônica no ombro. Mas, mesmo que isso seja verdade, eles conseguem algo mais um pouco como se eles pensassem que tinham em Wade Miley 8211 um cara grosso que, se tudo corre bem, emanam seus periféricos um pouco. It8217s muito, muito fácil de imaginar outros resultados mais escuros para este movimento: os problemas de lesão de Gallardo8217 são piores em 2017, e os M8217s gastam 13M (11M de salário e 2M de buyout para a temporada 821718) para reabilitar o cara. Se ele é saudável, mas seu perfil de contatos de bola batida não se altera, ele poderia resolver, assim como Miley fez em Seattle. Depois de 2016, I8217m ficou absolutamente chocado, levou Seth Smith para que ele pensasse que Baltimore ficaria bem para sair do contrato. Há razões muito boas pelas quais este negócio está sendo destruído no Twitter e nas interwebs. Se os M8217s tivessem um melhor histórico de ajudar jarros veteranos, eu deveria entender um pouco mais. Mas Nathan Karns, que veio com muita vantagem e juventude, foi mal administrado e agora foi negociado. Wade Miley8230yeah, let8217s nem mesmo rehash isso. A grande história de sucesso de 2016 foi James Paxton, mas ele parecia decolar em Tacoma, e todas as histórias sobre suas mudanças mecânicas dão o crédito ao treinador de lançamento AAA Lance Painter. Se Gallardo não tiver problemas e puxa uma temporada 2015-Texas, melhor do que a soma de suas peças, do nada, isso ajuda bastante o time. Mas I8217m apenas surpreendeu que este bilhete para a loteria mais chata do mundo. Por favor, me dê uma temporada como Jason Vargas8217 2011 ou algo precisa de um novo par de cadarços) custou um time de partida. Marc w middot 3 de janeiro de 2017 middot Arquivado sob Mariners Os M8217s ganharam 86 jogos no ano passado, e estão novamente previstos para estarem em execução para um dos pontos do Wild Wild Wild. Eles também são uma das equipes mais velhas do AL8217, e vários jogadores estão agora em uma idade em que o declínio relacionado à idade vem de forma rápida e decisiva. Esta é a premissa desta peça de Thomas Jenkins em BTBS no outro dia, e é o foco desta grande postagem de David Skiba em LL algumas semanas atrás. It8217s também algo sobre o qual eu escrevi em julho. As ramificações são bastante grandes, I8217d dizer 8211 o M8217s don8217t ter o sistema de fazenda para fazer upgrades de alto impacto, eles não foram jogadores no sorteio Chris SaleJose Quintana e, portanto, eles lutam para fechar um acordo no prazo de negociação se eles estiverem em disputa. Eu gosto de Tyler O8217Neill, mas o M8217s don8217t tem um LindorCorreaBryantBetts-tipo prestes a bater as grandes ligas. Eles estão a uma distância impressionante em 2017, mas o risco negativo é bastante grande. Isso fica em uma divisão interessante que os dois abriram sobre os M8217 em toda a blogosfera e no Twitter dois campos opostos, cada um deles aponta para um conjunto de fatos, faz alguns argumentos lógicos e chega a conclusões muito diferentes. Os M8217s são uma boa equipe que está projetada para competir pelos playoffs, e os M8217s parecem que eles caíram um passo atrás de alguns de seus rivais, e se a temporada começou hoje, parece um jogador ou dois curtos no que pode ser o seu melhor tiro Em disputa por um tempo. A chave para esta aparente discrepância é o fato de que seu núcleo, agora complementado com SS Jean Segura, está entre os mais voláteis no baseball 8211, algo que vemos quando olhamos suas projeções para 2017. Cerca de um mês atrás, houve uma conversa interessante No twitter entre várias pessoas da actualformer LL sobre as projeções de Steamer para o núcleo do M8217s de Nelson Cruz, Robinson Cano, Kyle Seager e Jean Segura. Logan Davis observou que as projeções para este quarteto rasparam um grande total de cerca de 11 WAR de sua produção de 2016, ou seja, a produção prevista era muito, muito inferior à sua história recente, um fato que reduziu ou mesmo eliminou a diferença entre os M8217 e Anjos, por exemplo, e fez o M8217 parecer muito pior do que os Astros. Isso levou a alguns seguimentos sobre a frequência com que isso acontece. Esta pergunta, aparentemente simples, é realmente duas partes distintas: com que frequência uma equipe perde 10 WAR de seus jogadores-estrela (responde: o tempo todo) e com que frequência um grupo de jogadores de nível estelar prevê perder 10 WAR entre eles (responda: Não frequentemente) A razão para este pequeno desvio histórico é dupla. Primeiro, lol 2015 Nationals, mas segundo, e mais importante, destaca PORQUE muitos fãs estão tão nervosos em relação a 2017 e por que as pessoas estão cada vez mais frustradas por uma equipe que ainda estava projetada para enfrentar. Então, em primeiro lugar, let8217s dê uma olhada em equipes que perderam 10 WAR entre quatro jogadores 8211 quatro estrelas ou regulares cuja produção coletiva cai por 10 vitórias completas de um ano para o outro. Meu primeiro pensamento foi procurar equipes bem envelhecidas, e sim, isso produziu uma tonelada de equipes que fizeram isso. 2009 Phillies, claro. 2004 Mariners Oooohhh sim. Você pode encontrar equipes que atendam a este critério ao olhar para equipes que aparentemente superaram, como os Chicago White Sox de 2005, ou, com um pouco menos ênfase em 8220achievement, 8221 2007 Mariners. Você pode encontrar equipes que perderam 10 WAR entre 4 jogadores em todo o lugar, porque é basicamente o baseball comum, imprevisível, etc., etc. Mas algumas equipes clamam por mais explicações. Eu mencionei os White Sox, que perderam um grupo de WAR no ano seguinte à sua improvável vitória na Série Mundial em 2005, mas eles hilariantes (dependendo de seus sentimentos por eles) fizeram novamente no próximo ano, com um grupo diferente de jogadores. Ou seja, eles perderam um monte de produção de 2005 a 2006 (Buehrle teve um ano abaixo, e Scott Podsednik voltou à terra, e Neal Cotts desmoronou completamente, apenas para acontecer anos e anos depois com os Rangers), mas depois um Grupo totalmente diferente de estrelas face-plantadas de 2006 a 2007 (Jermaine Dye passou de todas as estrelas para o nível de sub-substituição, e Joe Crede desmoronou completamente aos 28 anos. Ainda assim, o colapso-núcleo mais irreal na memória recente pertence a Os Estados Unidos de 2014 a 15 de Washington. Em 2014, os Nats tiveram quatro jogadores de posição no valor de pelo menos 4 WAR. Um ano depois, esse grupo lançou um grande total de quase 16 WAR, com seus dois melhores jogadores mais produtivos em 2014, Anthony Rendon e Jayson Werth, perdendo 11 WAR entre eles. Por WAR baseada em RA9, sua equipe de pitching também foi barrada, com Tanner Roark e Doug Fister perdendo outra GUERRA 8.5 nesse ano. Nenhuma equipe poderia sobreviver a uma implosão assim e os Nats não foram a exceção , Apesar do fato de Bryce Harper ter passado de 1,4 WAR em 2014 todo o caminho até 9,5 em 2015. Seu gerente foi demitido, e seu preço mais caro, o fim do prazo, tentou atrapalhar o MVP da NL no meio de uma das melhores temporadas ofensivas em memória recente. Alguém deveria escrever um livro sobre essa equipe. Então, as equipes perdem a produção o tempo todo 8211, mas as equipes perdem muitas vitórias nas projeções Quase nunca. Aqui, precisamos encontrar não só equipes que ultrapassaram, mas os jogadores com trajetórias de carreira realmente estranhas, seja os caras que eram muito novos para que as projeções pudessem lidar com o seu verdadeiro talento, caras no final de suas carreiras que combatem o envelhecimento muito melhor Do que seus jogadores históricos de comparação, ou caras com arcos de carreira realmente estranhos. Os M8217 agora têm duas estrelas de envelhecimento em Nelson Cruz e Robinson Cano, cujas comps começaram a se tornar ruins em torno dessa idade. Os principais competidores de Nelson Cruz8217s até os 35 anos (e Cruz jogou metade de 2016 aos 36 anos, graças ao aniversário de 1º de julho) foram todos essencialmente feitos aos 36. Cano é apenas 34, mas não é surpreendente que os sistemas de projeção don8217t saibam o que fazer Faça dele graças ao que só podemos esperar que fosse uma anomalia atormentada em 2015. Seus comps não são tão encorajadores, mesmo incluindo o salão das famas 8211 Ryne Sandberg postou sua última linha de batalha OPS maior que a média aos 33 anos , E Bobby Doerr se aposentou após a idade de 33 anos. Vern Stephens foi essencialmente cozido em 35, Scott Rolen por 36. Existem algumas fases de declínio muito mais encorajadoras, de George Brett8217 e Adrian Beltre8217s, portanto, não são todas as más notícias, mas você pode ver por que qualquer sistema de projeção que leva a idade em conta é Sendo um pouco suspeito de Cano e Cruz. E isso nos leva a Jean Segura, um cara que era uma média de média da liga aos 23 anos antes de passar duas temporadas cheias sem feridas, como Luis Sardinas, antes de se retirar como um shortstop de 5 vitórias no ano passado. Mesmo dando mais peso para 2016, qualquer projeção ofensiva (uma usando matemática, é possível argumentar que seu trabalho com o guru Bob Tewksbary substitui o que os números digam) vai derrubar várias cavilhas. Emparelhando-o com Cruz, dono de um dos arcos de carreira mais estranhos de uma geração. E você tem uma tempestade perfeita. As barras de erro em torno de quaisquer projeções para Cruz ou Segura devem ser realmente, muito amplas. Se o ano de 2016 era um ano de carreira, se ele conservasse qualquer vestígio do Jean Segura que colocava um OBP no meio da década de 2.80 no Arizona ao longo de 1.100 PAs 8211, então os M8217 precisam de ajuda séria em algum lugar para realmente correr a correr nas coisas . No lado positivo, você sabe quem mais tem um grupo central de estrelas que 8217re prevêem devolver uma tonelada de valor em relação aos 2016 The Cubs. Kris Bryant valia 8,4 fWAR no ano passado e ainda está melhorando, mas comps para caras tão bons que os jovens não são comuns, então ele deve comparado às estrelas velhas normais, em vez disso: sua projeção do Steamer é de 5,7 vitórias. Kyle Hendricks e Jon Lester, pelo menos pela RA9 WAR, também devem perder uma tonelada de valor, e Dexter Fowler (provavelmente não um Cub em 2017, mas o que quer que seja) teve seu melhor ano de sucesso e ano de campanha no ano passado, e assim é projetado para Perderá mais de 12 de seu valor no próximo ano. Muito correu bem para os Cachorros, e eles têm jogadores difíceis de figura, fazendo suas projeções parecerem muito menos rosadas do que um fã típico de Cachorros poderia pensar. E, no entanto, os Cachorros ainda são uma das melhores equipas da liga. Dizendo que as projeções do M8217s parecem que os Cachorros são forçados, na melhor das hipóteses, e desonesto no pior, então eu apenas digo que as projeções M8217s e Cubs têm pelo menos uma similaridade. Tudo isso apenas nos traz de volta para onde começamos, no entanto. We8217ve ilustrado por que as projeções vão se esforçar e, portanto, as razões pelas quais o M8217s parece extraordinariamente volátil em 2017. Mas a volatilidade funciona de ambos os modos, cada uma das projeções os tem atrás dos Astros, mas, dado as projeções, don8217t sabe o que fazer com o CruzSeguraCano8230. Eles sabem que é sempre uma tarefa errada para lápis na produção do ano passado da década de 80 dos melhores rapazes e, em seguida, adicione uma regressão (positiva) para os caras que lutaram e chamam-no de um clube de bola contundente, mas os M8217 têm motivos para pensar que suas estrelas Seja melhor do que muitos pensam em 2017. Ao mesmo tempo, os M8217s poderiam colapsar muito facilmente se o fim chegar cedo e ignominiosamente para Nelson Cruz e se Segura voltar para Zack Cozart, mas sem a luva. Tudo o que posso dizer é que eu realmente espero que o potencial para os M8217s vencerem suas projeções por muito tempo não é um fator que 8217s os levou a ser tão tentativos no mês passado. I8217d odeio pensar que os M8217s estão confiantes de que a equipe como atualmente construída pode competir pelo AL West, colocando assim algum sentimento de urgência para obter outro iniciante. Talvez eles nunca tenham estado envolvidos com Edwin Encarnacion (que, aparentemente, não queriam jogar na costa oeste), e eles não podem convencer José Bautista para se juntar ao esquadrão de mais de 30 anos em Seattle, mas eles precisam ser criativos 8211 e em breve 8211 Para melhorar a sua execução de prevenção. Não há muita ajuda na fazenda, pelo menos para 2017, e o clube não tem profundidade de arremesso. Isso é crítico, porque novamente, uma vez que Cruz e Iwakuma vão, o clube começa a parecer bastante medíocre, muito rápido. Marc w middot 8 de dezembro de 2016 middot Arquivado sob Mariners 1: a MLB realizou o projeto de Regra 5 hoje nas reuniões de inverno em Washington, DC, e com a lista M8217s completa, eles não conseguiram fazer seleções na fase da liga grande. Eles estavam envolvidos, no entanto. Tampa levou o SP Kevin Gadea dos M8217s com a 4ª seleção geral, e esse dificulta 8230 pelo menos, tanto quanto (potencialmente) perder um garoto de 22 anos que só chegou a A-ball até o final de 2016 pode doer. Gadea assinou para apenas 42 mil da Nicarágua em 2013 com idade comparável de 18 anos. He8217d foi elegível para o período de assinatura de 2 de julho antes, mas tinha ficado louco como um bêbado de 3B antes que um explorador de M8217 sugerisse que ele tentasse lançar. Esse início tardio no monte explica sua progressão relativamente lenta: ele lançou na liga venezuelana depois de assinar em 2013, depois mudou-se para a Liga do Arizona em 2014, mas lutou com seu comando e acabou mudando-se para a Liga Dominicana em 2015 (Depois que os M8217 fecharam suas operações VSL). Algo claramente clicou para ele em 2015, como ele parecia um jarro diferente em 2016. Começando de novo no AZL, ele caminhou 3 em 18 13 IP, e então se mudou para se juntar a Clinton na Midwest League. O Lumberking facilitou-o, dando-lhe alguns passeios mais curtos no início, mas ele decolou e foi o ás da equipe Clinton até o final do ano. Luiz Gohara foi ótimo e é o nome do maior prospecto, mas Gadea publicou melhores números: Gohara marcou 60 e andou 20 em 54 13 IP, enquanto Gadea marcou 72 e andou apenas 11 em 50 13 IP. Gadea fechou o ano em uma corrida fenomenal 8211 em suas últimas 5 partidas, Gadea marcou 48 enquanto caminhava apenas 5 em 31 entradas. Sim, ele chegou ao campeonato do meio-oeste e ao 2282, mas esse tipo de comando é bastante especial em um jogador ex-jogador 8211 e os M8217 devem saber, dado suas conversões 3B-to-RP (por exemplo, Ramon Morla). Gohara não estava disponível no rascunho da Regra 5, mas, mesmo que fosse, acho que você pode fazer o caso de que a Gadea seja tão provável ou talvez seja mais provável que fique com uma equipe. Os Raios podem armazenar Gadea em seu bullpen para 2017, e então queremos iniciá-lo novamente em 2018 ou, se ele for passvelmente, o desenvolva como um intrigante set-up man. Para mim, a Gadea era facilmente uma perspectiva do top 20 M8217s, com a possibilidade de começar 2017 no top 10. Maldito seja. Os M8217 fizeram alguns movimentos na fase de liga menor do rascunho da Regra 5 também, pegando o ajudante do macaco Paul Paez dos Mets e OF Chuck Taylor dos D-Backs, enquanto perdiam as ferramentas de overslot, prosseguindo Austin Wilson para os Cardinals. Paez tem um FB na faixa de 87mph e, portanto, não foi um grande atacante (embora sua taxa de K tenha aumentado em seu primeiro gosto de AA no ano passado). Ele não parece ser um clone Rzepczynski 8211 he8217s, um lançador de flyball, que é um pouco notável, dada a falta de HRs, permitida. Isso e seu controle são provavelmente suas habilidades mais notáveis, e ele parece adicionar alguma profundidade ao bullpen Tacoma8217s no próximo ano. O sinal de alerta é que, apesar de alguns Ks, ele se acendeu na AA Eastern League, desistiu de 4 HRs (duplicando o total de sua carreira) e 29 hits em menos de 20 IP. Chuck Taylor foi uma seleção de rodapé de alta rodada dos Diamondbacks, e mostrou algumas ferramentas sólidas, mas tem energia essencialmente zero. Isso colocou muita pressão sobre suas habilidades de bat-to-ball e, finalmente, ele simplesmente não conseguiu bater o suficiente para ficar com as cobras. O potencial de lá em algum lugar, como observou Kiley McDaniel alguns anos atrás, mas Taylor8217s entrou em colapso desde que essa nota foi escrita. Claro, pode-se dizer o mesmo sobre Austin Wilson, o ex-Stanford corner, de quem os exploradores seguiram há anos. Como Taylor, Wilson poderia caminhar, mas nunca bateu por média ou potência suficiente para subir de movimento. Ambos os jogadores, sem dúvida, têm alguma habilidade inexplorada em algum lugar, e então eu gosto de ver isso como uma espécie de comércio de mudanças de cenário. A equipe de desenvolvimento de jogadores de cartas tem sido tremenda e quem sabe, talvez eles possam fazer alguns ajustes, mas não tem nenhum sentido, lamentando perder Wilson, que K8217 deu um estranho 36 clip no ano passado na Cal League. Taylor faz muito mais contato, mas não ajudou qualquer um, o que implica um monte de bolas lentas. He8217ll ser um projeto M8217s agora, e figuras para jogar em AA Arkansas ou talvez um Modesto. 2: Os M8217s reforçaram sua profundidade de lançamento inicial ao pegar RHP Chris Heston dos Giants para que um jogador seja nomeado mais tarde. Heston famosa jogou um não-hitter contra os Mets em 2015 como iniciante novato. Ele lançou quase 180 IP e fez 31 partidas para SF nesse ano, com um 4.02 FIP perfeitamente aceitável, 3.95 ERA. He8217s não é abrupto, com a platina na faixa de 90mph e um grande slider slurvy quebra, uma curva e uma mudança, e, infelizmente, também não é um grande cara de controle. Graças ao seu reboco baixo e mudar, ele é um braço de GB decente, mas o seu verdadeiro cartão de transporte é a habilidade de desligar os direitos. O combo de sinkerslider está altamente correlacionado com as divisões de pelotão e os lançamentos de Heston8217s se movem um pouco, graças a um ponto de liberação mais baixo que está correlacionado com as dificuldades com os rebatedores em oposição. Na verdade, esquerdistas o incendiaram em 2015, atingindo .270.356.462, o que é muito ruim para um iniciante da NL que joga a metade de seus jogos em San Francisco. Claro, o outro lado é que ele dominou os direitos, com uma proporção de 3.3 K: BB, muito poucos HRs e um FIP abaixo de 3. Ele perdeu quase todo o ano de 2016 com uma lesão oblíqua ele registrou apenas 4 IP para SF e parecia Um jarro diferente, muitas vezes lutando para bater 87. Este é um movimento sólido de retorno, e é praticamente livre de riscos, embora tenhamos que ver quem é o PTBNL, é claro. Para dar espaço aos 40 homens, o M8217s DFA8217d Richie Shaffer, o promissor, mas lutando se eles adquiriram dos Rays mais cedo esta temporada. 3: Os M8217s têm sido bastante abertos quanto ao desejo de adquirir outro iniciador sólido da MLB para compensar a perda de Taijuan Walker no comércio Jean Segura. Heston ajuda com a profundidade, mas claramente não é alguém que os M8217s podem apenas lapidar na rotação da liga grande, as chances são boas, ele não faz a lista do M8217 e se dirige em busca de outra oportunidade. Assim, se os M8217s quiserem adquirir algum ganho de rotação, eles podem procurar os agentes livres ainda disponíveis. Em geral, esse tipo de pensamento é assustador, dada a qualidade geral dos lançadores de FA este ano. O melhor deles já assinou de qualquer maneira, agora que Rich Hill assinou um acordo com os Dodgers. Neste ponto, qualquer um no mercado vem com uma série de bandeiras vermelhas, mas isso pode realmente torná-los mais atraentes para Jerry Dipoto, que tem sido muito ativo em baseball8217s bargain bin no ano passado. Isabelle Minasian tem um excelente artigo sobre talvez o mais intrigante dos brinquedos quebrados no mercado, ex-Padres RHP Tyson Ross. Ross, um nativo de Oakland, apresentou o Atletismo em 2010 e foi enviado para San Diego no imortal acordo de Andy Parino de 2012. Os Padres levaram-no a usar seu controle deslizante apertado mais e ele se tornou incrivelmente valioso Starter, acumulando 9,5 fWAR nos 3 anos a partir de 2013-2015. He8217s always been somewhat injury prone, and ended up losing his 2016 with his most severe injury yet: a shoulder problem that was eventually diagnosed as Thoracic Outlet Syndrome. Ross had thoracic outlet surgery on his right shoulder this past October, which means it8217s likely he won8217t be ready for spring training, but the recovery time from TOS is much, much less than it is from Tommy John or more serious shoulder procedures. In a perfect world, he could pitch most of the year and bounce all the way back to his pre-injury self. Years ago, thoracic outlet syndrome was an extremely rarerarely-diagnosed issue that would show up as numbness in the arm or fingers. It8217s caused by nerves getting pinched or compressed by the upper ribs and arm, and doctors found that an easy fix to give the nerve bundle more room was just to remove a rib (presumably the 1st rib, just under the clavicle). I8217ve joked for years on this blog that it could8217ve been named the Texas Rangers surgery, as the Rangers seemed to be the first to diagnose it in ballplayers 8211 Kenny Rogers and Hank Blalock were among the first to have it done around 10 years ago. And once they started looking for it, they found it everywhere. John Rheinecker, Matt Harrison, etc. Soon, other teams cottoned on, and it8217s now somewhat common. The M8217s picked up Chris Young after he had it, and signed Jeremy Bonderman after he restarted his career following the procedure. That said, just because it8217s common doesn8217t mean it8217s safe and routine. Just as Tommy John surgery isn8217t foolproof, TOS isn8217t minor surgery. Shaun Marcum never really recovered following his, and the Padres 8211 a team with essentially no rotation 8211 were scared enough to non-tender Ross despite positive reports from Ross8217 surgeon. His Steamer projection has him as a better-than-league average starter in just shy of 150 IP, which seems high, but attainable. He8217s apparently looking for a one-year deal in the range of 9m-11m, which is probably a bit more than he8217d have gotten in arbitration. That8217s a lot of money for a guy who just got stitches in his shoulder removed, but it8217s also a one-year commitment to an All-Star caliber pitcher. From there, the risks just get riskier. Lefty Brett Anderson is someone I wouldn8217t mind the M8217s making a play for. He missed nearly all of 2016 after accepting the Dodgers qualifying offer for him, so he figures to make considerably less. His injury history spans several leather-bound volumes, and he8217s made 30 starts just twice in his 8-year MLB career. Still, he was decent as recently as 2015, and helps balance an M8217s rotation that8217s grown increasingly right-handed. You can8217t count on him the whole year, but that might allow the M8217s to get a longer look at Ariel Miranda. Safeco is no longer a great place to pitch for lefties, but there are worse places to go if you8217re looking for a one-year pillow contract. Derek Holland8217s available after the Rangers declined their option on him. Another lefty, and another guy with an extensive injury history (he needed knee surgery after being undercut by his dog, once, and has had severe, lingering shoulder problems), Holland pitched over 100 (so-so) innings last year, and may command a bit more money solely because he was able to take the ball in 2016. That said, he hasn8217t really been good since 2013, and has had serious HR issues for much of his career. If you8217re willing to accept some risk and the need for more than a one-year commitment, it might be better to look at Jason Hammel, who also had his team option declined. Hammel struggled at the end of the year, and has had some injury issues of his own in recent years, but his topped 150 IP in each of the last three years. This is what passes for an interesting option in this horrific FA market, but it8217s possible that teams stay away and the price on all of these guys 8211 and Doug Fister 8211 drops, but the M8217s might want to go with a short FA commitment instead of trading more of their prospects away. marc w middot December 6, 2016 middot Filed Under Mariners Not that long ago, I had a post about some early contenders for the bullpen pile after the M8217s acquired Dean Kiekhefer in a waiver claim. With his low 34 delivery and the resultant horizontal movement, he looked a bit like fellow new-Mariner, Ryan Weber. Two things are clear at this point, some 13-14 months into the Jerry Dipoto tenure: first, the man cannot stop acquiring relievers, and second, when he does, he seems to like to acquire two or three guys with the same approachskills. I thought back to that 8220buy in bulk8221 strategy when looking into new Mariner Casey Fien. John Trupin has a handy overview of Fien over at Lookout Landing. The short version is that he was once a perfectly, er, fine member of the Twins bullpen, who was absolutely destroyed by the home run ball last year. His career walk rate is under 5 too, so at first glance, this looked a bit like acquiring another Evan Scribner. Solid K-BB, horrific HR9 buy-low guys who can appear to improve a ton thanks to some regression in their HRFB rates. Scribner gave up an astonishing 14 HRs in 60 IP for Oakland in 2015, which is why he was available for a low-level prospect despite posting one of the best K-BB marks in all of baseball. Well, Fien gave up 13 HRs last year in just 39 13 IP, good for a vertiginous HR9 of 2.97. That8217ll get you waived, and indeed, Minnesota waived him last year. He caught on with the Dodgers, but didn8217t fare any better, so he8217ll cost the M8217s 1.1 million if he sticks on the MLB roster. The more you look at how he pitches, though, the less like Scribner he looks. Scribner has a fairly high-spin fastball, at 2,286 RPMs and a 91mph velocity. Fien actually blows Scribner out of the water in this measure, with a high-spin, 2,501 RPM fastball at 93.9mph. To borrow a concept from Kyle Boddy, who likes to use the ratio of RPM to MPH, Fien still gets more spin per MPH than Scribner, and more still than the MLB league average ratio for four-seam fastballs. Looking at each pitcher8217s curve, the picture8217s reversed. Scribner has elite curveball spin (well over 2,800 RPM, compared to a league avrerage of 2,471), which I8217m sure was something that attracted the attention of the M8217s analytical staff. Fien8217s comes in at 2,620, so higher than league average, but far short of Scribner8217s. But look at pitch movement, and they look completely different: Evan Scribner8217s fastball has a lot of effective spin, meaning the spin is producing movement (in this case, rise). Fien8217s four-seam rises a tiny bit more than average, but it8217s nothing to write home about. Fien8217s second pitch, a pitch he goes to about 40 of the time is his cutter, which again has remarkably high spin rates (2,500 RPMs) and not much in the way of actual movement. Does this sound familiar This high-spin, meh-movement repertoire was something I spent far too long discussing in the context of Rob Whalen, another new Mariner. Fien8217s cutter looks a bit like Whalen8217s odd fastball. Both come in around 90mph, have 0 horizontal movement, and less-than-normal-fastball amounts of vertical rise. As cutters produce, on average, worse contact, a team might want to look at high-spin pitchers who, for whatever reason, don8217t get much transverse (movement-causing) spin on the ball. That8217s the theory, anyway. On the field, Fien8217s cutter got obliterated last year, with batters slugging .649 on it. Even looking at his career as a whole, they8217re slugging .452, which is pretty high for a reliever who8217s spent his career in the low-scoring 20108217s. That said, it may help disguise his flat four-seamer, which has been pretty effective for him, 2016 aside. If the M8217s think he was tipping his pitches or have some other tweak in mind, he8217d be a perfectly serviceable middle-relief guy, though it8217s worth noting that the M8217s bullpen8217s already pretty full. In any event, while Fien is definitely not a clone of Rob Whalen, there are some surface similarities that make me wonder if they8217re traits that the M8217s are actively searching for. I8217d love to know more about how teams value gyro spin, and why it might be useful. In the public analytical space, we tend to focus on movement, and for some very good reasons: high-spin, high-movement curves really do seem to be 8220better.8221 But I8217m not at all convinced that gyro spin is bad in a slider. A high-spin, low movement fastball might also provide some sort of advantage, either by producing weaker contact or by confusing hitters whose swing paths essentially build in the horizontal movement that nearly all fastballs have. Spin efficiency, the ratio of transverse to total spin, is useful in some contexts, but less so in others. Why is that, and how might a pitcher8217s arsenal 8211 or pitch sequencing 8211 take advantage of it Boddy calls this ratio 8220Bauer Units .8221 The league average for four-seamers was 24.3 last year. Scribner8217s fastball ranked at 25.3, while Fien was up at 26.6. Using his league indexed BU measure, Fien comes in at 109. marc w middot December 5, 2016 middot Filed Under Mariners You8217ve got to hand it Jerry Dipoto: there8217s no subterfuge, no hiding his wish-list. He8217s told everyone who8217ll listen for months that a high priority of the team was signing a veteran left-hander to round out the team8217s bullpen, so we can8217t be shocked that he8217s signed Marc Rzepczynski to a two-year deal. I think we can be a little surprised that he8217s guaranteed the player nicknamed Scrabble 2 years and 11 million, slightly more than the 2-year, 10 million deal he gave Steve Cishek, and the second largest contract he8217s given out in his tenure as GM. He signed last year8217s starting catcher for 1 guaranteed year, and he8217ll pay Chooch Ruiz 5m to back up Mike Zunino this year. Obviously the biggest deal was Hisashi Iwakuma8217s extension, but even in that 3-year deal, only the first year was guaranteed. Iwakuma hit the IP threshold to give him a second year, and could earn that third year if he stays healthy, but Dipoto8217s been somewhat reluctant to dive into the free agent market, unless he8217s shopping for relievers. And he8217s seemingly always shopping for relievers. Marc Rzepczynski8217s legitimately great at two things: absolutely neutralizing left-handed power and getting ground balls. Since 2010, Rzepczynski8217s .293 SLG allowed to lefties ranks 9th out of 265 pitchers, just behind Clayton Kershaw, but a bit above Brett Cecil, who just signed a 4-year deal with St. Louis. Those are legitimate strengths, and Rzepczynski8217s consistency is a key reason he8217s been traded mid-season four times already. A contending team that believes they8217ll face some critical, high-leverage situations involving a tough left-handed hitter could do worse than picking up Marc Rzepczynski. It8217s just that the going rate for Rzepczynski hasn8217t been all that high - Cleveland got him for a non-prospect from Toronto. Oakland got him as a smaller part of the Yonder Alonso deal, and then swapped him for a lower-ranked (but intriguing ) prospect from Washington. So, should M8217s fans banish any doubts from their mind and cheer this solid investment in a low-risk bullpen arm, the baseballing equivalent of investing in treasury bonds Here8217s another leaderboard, looking at how pitchers have fared against RIGHT handed batters since 2010, with a minimum of 150 IP. Marc Rzepczynski8217s OBP-against is the highest. out of 372 qualified pitchers, at .391. Yes, yes, regress those results, and you need 2,000 PAs of average splits, etc. But the problem is, Rzepczynski8217s splits are just getting worse, not better, with time. Scrabble hasn8217t allowed righties to post an OBP below .400 since 2012. 8220Usage will take care of this,8221 you say. The problem is that it8217s really, really hard to ensure any pitcher will see a steady diet of same-handed hitters. Last year, Scrabble faced 102 RHBs and 113 LHBs. For his career, he8217s faced 960 righties and 768 lefties. Even with benches constricted by the growth of the modern bullpen, teams can, and do, pinch hit when they see splits like Scrabble8217s. It8217s likely that his high walk rate is his adaptation to life as a pitcher whom righties see really well, and that8217s further solidified his role as a true LOOGY (Lefty One-Out-GuY). He8217s made over 70 appearances in each of the last 3 years, but hasn8217t tossed 50 IP in any of them. The M8217s aren8217t going to get a lot of total innings from their 11 million man, so they need to make sure those innings count. For whatever reason, that hasn8217t usually been the case for Scrabble. For obvious reasons, Rzepczynski isn8217t a threat to close, and closers typically post the highest leverage index for players, meaning that they enter the game with the highest stakes: the situations featuring the biggest possible swing in win expectancy. Closers might get near a gmLI of 2, with elite set-up menfiremen coming in around 1.5. Scrabble was at 1.13 last year, and 1.18 for his career, meaning he was used in equivalent situations as Drew Storen, and a bit less critical than Tom Wilhelmsen. The M8217s bullpen averaged a gmLI of 1.16 last year, with Cishek and Diaz leading the group. If this move is going to pay off, the M8217s need to get Scrabble in at crucial times. At one point, the M8217s seemed to be after a high-octane. flame-throwing lefty, and Rzepczynski isn8217t that. He now throws about 91, with a big slider as his primary weapon. Rzepczynski8217s consistent dominance of lefties mean he can be used in late-inning, pressure-packed situations, but he8217s not an Andrew Miller type. Dipoto has, in fact, already made a move for a lefty reliever with premium velocity and high upside in his trade for James Pazos. Signing Rzepczynski makes that move a bit harder to figure out the M8217s now have fewer situations in which they can use Pazos, and while letting him pitch low-leverage innings seems like a good way to ease him in to the majors, it means the M8217s may now struggle to find enough IP for two pieces they spent a decent amount of capital on. Of course, this worry about cost and IP may be yet another understandable miscalculation of the baseball market. 11M for 2 years of anything in baseball isn8217t much anymore, and again, with proper usage, it could become money well spent. It8217s just surprising given Dipoto8217s reticence to dive into the market elsewhere. Take Steve Pearce, the lefty-mashing RH bat that just signed for Toronto for just a touch more than Scrabble will get. Both players have limitations and both are seen more as platoon players. To me, Pearce makes a heck of a lot more sense, especially given the fact that the M8217s already have a high-octane, lefty-destroying bullpen arm in Edwin Diaz. This isn8217t to say Scrabble doesn8217t have value 8211 he does 8211 but it just underscores the importance Dipoto and the M8217s place on the bullpen. A year ago, the M8217s seemed to be the one team avoiding the mad rush to spend money on super 8216pens, like the one the Yankees constructed. The M8217s stayed out of that, and focused on role on certain types: guys who8217d been stung by high HR rates, but walked no one. It8217s not that they didn8217t spend on the bullpen, they just looked for different (and cheaper) skillsets than the Yanks and Red Sox sought. They seem to be taking the same approach this year 8211 leaving Aroldis Chapman to someone else, and instead building a pen around some key roles, roles that don8217t require 103mph fastballs. That8217s sensible enough, but you wonder if the somewhat unorthodox approach isn8217t as blind to a pitcher8217s market value as a spend-at-all-cost alternative would be. marc w middot November 30, 2016 middot Filed Under Mariners Rob Whalen is one of two starting pitcher prospects the M8217s picked up from Atlanta in exchange for Alex Jackson, and given his size, stuff, and results in his first big league trial with the Braves, I kind of skipped over him in my write-up of the trade to get to Max Povse. Povse is 6821788243, and while his fastball velo has been all over the map, it8217s at least touched the mid-90s, something Whalen is probably not going to do. That said, I think I may have skipped over Whalen a bit too quickly. Whalen8217s minor league track record is more encouraging, in that he8217s consistently posted great runs-allowed numbers despite a good-but-not-great FIP thanks to low BABIPs. It8217s generally a fool8217s errand to count on something like that long term, and even though he had a low BABIP with the Braves, it didn8217t prevent him from getting knocked around. The story8217s somewhat similar for the guy I sawstill see as his best comparison, albeit purely from a pitch fxpitch movement standpoint: former Dodger Stephen Fife. But when I mentioned Whalen8217s 90mph fastball, I mentioned another, better, comp: 8220Purely on movement, his four seam looks like Garrett Richards, though of course Richards adds about 7-8 MPH to the mix.8221 How does this change how we might see Whalen, particularly given the huge gap in velocity between the two odd fastballs Back in 2015, I geeked out about Garrett Richards8217 spin in this game post before he faced off against Felix and the M8217s. As Alan Nathan8217s baseball physics lessons teach us, there are two kinds of spin a pitcher can impart to the ball. One, the one we generally care about, is transverse spin, which is what causes the pitch to move. A fourseam fastball from Chris Young or Yu Darvish has a ton of backspin, meaning that the ball is spinning around an axis perpendicular to the direction the pitch is going. In this case, that spin causes turbulence behind the ball, and the magnus force pushes the fastball up (Ok, technically, it just resists gravity more than a non-spinning pitch would). This backspin produces the big 8220rise8221 or vertical movement you see from pitchers, and these rising FBs generally induce more swinging strikes. The other type of spin, gyro spin, is on an axis parallel to the direction of travel: this is akin to a spiral in football. The quarterback isn8217t throwing a spiral to cause the ball to move 8211 he8217s throwing a spiral so that it DOES NOT deviate from its course. Gyro spin in a baseball produces no movement compared to a ball thrown without spin. If you measure a pitch8217s spin based on that pitch8217s movement 8211 and that8217s exactly how pitch FX does it (it imputes spin from trajectory, so it8217s only picking up transverse spin) 8211 then you8217ll find that fastballs move like crazy, while some breaking balls, particularly sliders, don8217t 8220move8221 at all. Trackman8217s cameras can actually measure spin directly instead of deriving it from other data, so it8217s an entirely different measure, one that includes both transverse and gyro spin. In general, as Alan Nathan found. fastballs have a higher proportion of transverse spin (again, think of a rising fastball), and thus the measures of spin on fastballs in pitch fx and trackman are closer than they are for sliders and curves. But not for Garrett Richards. Pull up a pitch fx view of his fastball, like this one. and you8217ll see a pitcher with a low spin fastball 8211 well under 2,000 RPM 8211 but a higher (2100) rate on his curve. Ask TrackmanStatcast, and the picture8217s very, very different: Garrett Richards is the high-spin poster boy. His four-seam fastball, the one pitch fx shows as spinning very little, is a wonder in Statcast, spinning 2,500 times per minute. That8217s a huge, huge discrepancy, and the only explanation is that there8217s a lot 8211 an absolute ton 8211 of gyro spin on his fastball. Eric Longenhagen8217s scouting report on Whalen is a lot like mine 8211 90mph, scuffled with Atlanta, may be a reliever or swingman. But buried at the end was a note about Whalen8217s exceptional spin rates, measured at 2,400RPMs. I pulled up Baseballsavant, and it8217s true: Whalen8217s FB spins like crazy, it just isn8217t generating any movement, just like Richards8217. But why would you want that If high transverse spin creates movement (and whiffs), then isn8217t that better than this useless gyro stuff Maybe not. Years ago, Max Marchi set out to categorize pitches and how batters reacted to them with pitch FX. Instead of using the standard pitch types, or what MLBAM classified them as (or even what the pitchers themselves called them), he made his own categories based on how they moved. In the end, he came up with 17 categories, separating 8220jumping8221 fastballs (think Chris Young) from 8220riding8221 fastballs (think Sean Manaea now, or old school Randy Johnson). This debate about where the boundary between a slider and a cutter or a fastball and a cutter is keeps popping up, and it8217s something I8217ve mentioned here before. Anyway, if you click the link to Max8217s work, his 8220cutter8221 bin had an average horizontal movement of -0.48243 with vertical movement of 6.68243. Garrett Richards8217 8220four seam8221 last year had average horizontal movement of -0.48243 with vertical movement of 6.98243. Rob Whalen8217s 8220four seam8221 last year averaged -0.28243 and 6.58243, respectively. There are two things I take from this: first, Whalen and Richards8217 four-seamers are actually cutters, and second, a handy definition for this sort of cutter (not those way over on the slider end) is a fastball thrown with gyro spin. They spin like mad, but don8217t move like mad. Ok, ok, so again, why does that matter Why should we care more if we call them cutters versus four-seamers versus shplankoids Because batters have a bit more trouble with cutters 8211 their movement may be part of the reason why. Firing up statcast, we see that the average exit velocity 8211 how hard the average ball was hit 8211 on a four-seam fastball in 2016 was 90.5 MPH. For sinkers. it8217s exactly the same, 90.5 MPH. For cutters, the average exit velocity was just 87.5 MPH. This difference of 3.333 doesn8217t sound like much, but it is. If we look at the average slg on contact for balls hit at at least 90 MPH, we see a Godzilla-like SLGCON of .874. But for balls hit below 88 MPH, it plummets down to just .255. That8217s8230that8217s a big difference. There are caveats galore here. That SLGCON analysis is focused on balls in play, and thus misses the big advantage of the high transverse spin FB: all of the whiffs. It8217s also using MLBAM8217s definition of cutter, so it might be pulling in more slider-y pitches, perhaps thrown in slider counts like 0-2, 1-2, when SLGCON plummets for everyone, no matter what pitch is thrown. And then there8217s the obvious point that averages don8217t really help individual pitchers. Jarred Cosart throws a Richardsian 94-95mph cutter 70 of the time, and he got destroyed last year. Stephen Fife couldn8217t hack it either. Throwing a weird FB is not a panacea. It might, however, be a strategic move. Back in 2014, when he was still in the Mets org, Whalen pitched in the Arizona Fall League. Maybe due to pitching at the end of a long season, or maybe due to small sample weirdness, he got hit pretty hard in the desert. Looking at his meager pitch FX numbers from back in 2014, though, Whalen looks completely different. His four-seam was more of a traditional, rising, back-spinning offering. He didn8217t yet have a slider, just a slurvy breaking ball that showed less spin than average. Everything about Whalen8217s movement was just8230average (or worse). What he8217s done since then is split the meh slurve into an actual slider and a high-spin curve that comes in slower. Gone is the completely normal (but slow) four-seamer, replaced by his cuttery thing. Whalen dominated in the minors despite good-not-great K rates and K-BB with his new approach. It carried over into the bigs, but was undone by a bout of wildness. This was always Fife8217s downfall, and it8217s destroyed Cosart, too 8211 Cosart8217s career K-BB is around 3. Whalen still needs to limit his walks, but the great thing about the cutter-FB hybrid thing is that he doesn8217t NEED to post big K rates. Even getting hit fairly hard, and with a HR9 mark of nearly 1.5 last year, Whalen8217s average exit velocity was just 88 MPH, well below average. On grounders, it was under 84 MPH, which is great too bad he was more of a FB pitcher, but still, it8217s encouraging. You can begin to see how Whalen can succeed despite his underpowered arm, and despite the cautionary tales of Fife and Cosart. He may not need Richards8217 velocity (Collin McHugh is a 90-91 MPH example), and he may not need a lot of Ks. If he can use his gyro-spinning FB to limit contact authority, he may be better than I initially gave him credit for. marc w middot November 28, 2016 middot Filed Under Mariners A day ago 8211 literally a day ago 8211 I said this of the Jerry Dipoto M8217s: Jerry Dipoto and the Ms came to view a player whod played his way to a lower ceiling as having more value in trade even without a mint-conditioned prospect sheen than they do on the Ms roster. That was true of Tai Walker, who, despite adding a few wins above replacement level at the MLB level was clearly not picking up something that DipotoServais was laying down. It8217s also true of the latest Mariner to be traded: OF prospect Alex Jackson, the 6 overall pick in the 2014 draft, and one of the M8217s top prospects (based on pre-draft abilitypedigree) ever since. If M8217s fans have thought of Jackson since draft day, it8217s probably to lament his lack of progress. Most of this is Jackson8217s fault (he8217s still only been as high as Class A Clinton), and a great deal of that is due the lingering stain of Jackson8217s disastrous early 2015 stint with Clinton, where he was clearly unready for the pro arms that he faced. In every other assignment, he8217s hit a bit better than league average. It8217s not that Jackson8217s been out and out awful, it8217s that he8217s been flawed (his K rate is worryingly high) and his progress slower than we8217d expect from the consensus best prep bat in his draft class. Of course, that pedigree and the fact that he8217s been kind of okay (if you see past the expectations that come with his draft position) that enable Jerry Dipoto to acquire prospects for him. It would surprise no M8217s fan if Jackson stalls out in AA. You look at his peripheral stats, and you see a guy who looks like Mike Zunino, but in a corner OF spot, and that8217s just not going to work. And yet, the idea of a 8216prospect pedigree8217 is more than marketinghype and old-school mumbo-jumbo. Not many big leaguers suffered through the slumps Jackson has, but the uber-talents have a better track record (or, depending on your perspective, are granted a much longer leash andor second, third, amp fourth chances). Atlanta might 8216win8217 this trade handily. Jackson is, by some margin, the most talented ballplayer in the exchange. He8217s demonstrated some power, but really needs some help with making contact. In return, the M8217s get low-to-mid ceiling pitchers Robert Whalen and Max Povse. Whalen8217s best comparison player may be Stephen Fife, the one-time Dodger who was part of the 3-team trade that netted the M8217s Trayvon Robinson. He throws 90 and got hit hard in 5 starts for the Braves in 2016. Povse, a 6821788243 righty, is more of a traditional prospect, but doesn8217t have the pure stuff to be among Atlanta8217s org top 10 (or possibly 20). Whalen8217s fastball is something of an oddity in that it has absolutely zero horizontal movement, but also no vertical rise. Purely on movement, his four seam looks like Garrett Richards8217, though of course Richards adds about 7-8 MPH to the mix. That brings us to Stephen Fife, a long-time MiLB vet who possesses a similar FB and change-up. Fife8217s 8216odd8217 FB couldn8217t consistently confuse big league hitters, but he was okay in between injuries and minor league options. Despite Whalen8217s struggles, there8217s room for optimism. Whalen8217s average exit velocity was well below league average last year, and he was exceptionally good at limiting GB batted-ball authority. If part of that is skill and not just unfamiliarityluck, then he might have some value, particularly if he makes more use of his sinker. This is a longshot 5 prospect whose real utility may be at the AAA level, but if he can ride his weird low-spin movement to poor contact (he gave up very few 8216barrels8217, or exceptionally well-struck balls in his 20-odd IP), he may end up more useful than Jackson. And it8217s not just tiny-sample batted-ball data: Whalen8217s posted consistently low BABIPs throughout the minors and in his MLB stint, too. Of course, he8217s also coming off a shoulder injury that ended his 2016 campaign, and thus may be even riskier than the underpowered-funky-fastball-and-guile profile suggests. Povse has much more of a traditional prospect profile thanks to his 6821788243 frame and a sinking FB that8217s touched 97. He8217s also hit AA in 2016 and posted freakishly low walk rates. Despite all that, Povse hasn8217t wowed scouts because he8217s struggled to miss bats. In isolated games, he looks like an ace, but more often, he8217s been tall-Aaron-Cook, giving up a ton of (mostly grounded) contact. Still, if the M8217s look back on this trade fondly, it8217ll likely be due to Povse, who could morph into a Justin Masterson or Jeff Samardzija type, if everything breaks right. The return is8230fine, I suppose, and at least Povse holds out the possibility of some upside, but it feels amazing after following the team that couldn8217t quite quit Dustin AckleyJustin Smoak. The last time the M8217s moved a pre-Major Leagues first-rounder was when they packaged Philippe Aumont as part of the Cliff Lee deal (that worked out). They traded Adam Jones earlier 8211 you may have heard how that turned out 8211 but he8217d already hit AAA for the M8217s. The M8217s haven8217t made a move quite like this in a while, though the motivation for it may be similar to the Tai Walker trade we discussed yesterday. The M8217s were unhappy with Walker8217s effortfight during the year and moved him to AAA for a week or so in 2016. Following Jackson8217s lost 2015, the M8217s held him back in instructs until he met, as Ryan Divish reported. performance and attitude standards. He got out of instructs, but the M8217s haven8217t been shy about ID8217ing the prospects that frustrate them. They8217ve moved them despite performance struggles and despite their own public misgivings about the players, and yet it8217s hard to say it8217s really hurt them. Would Jackson have fetched more after 2014, if he could8217ve been moved in a Dansby Swanson-type deal Sure, but the fact is he wasn8217t, and given the M8217s made the move now, when every other club knew about the K8217s and the 8216attitude8217 concerns, Dipoto and company did all right. That8217s not to say it8217s a clear upgrade the way the WalkerSegura move was. This has a much, much bigger chance of blowing up in the M8217s faces. But at this point, Jackson8217s odds for contributing to the Mariners was quite low, and yet Dipoto was able to move him for something of value (not much value, but value nonetheless). Dipoto clearly had a contingency plan with Jackson, and in Atlanta 8211 a rebuilding team with a deep, deep farm system 8211 he had an ideal trading partner. Like a few low-walk pitchers before him, Povse8217s walk totals hide some elevated HBP numbers. It doesn8217t change his value or control grade, but it8217s worth remembering that his Bb or BB9 understates the number of batters he put on base. marc w middot November 27, 2016 middot Filed Under Mariners There8217s a natural tendency for people writing about baseball to judge a General Manager based on hisher biggest moves: the blockbuster trade that changes a franchise, the big first-round draft pick who turns into a star, the key free agent signing (or avoiding the big free agent land mines). This isn8217t wrong, of course, as big moves (especially when you can pick out the big moves with the benefit of hindsight) clearly do impact a team8217s chances. The problem is that they8217re not distributed evenly. The M8217s were able to take a risk with the Robinson Cano signing while the A8217s, for example, were not. Similarly, inheriting a team with a loaded farm system, a big new TV deal, or just a club in a big coastal city means you8217ve got a leg or two up on some of your rivals. And of course, even if you (correctly) saw that signing Player A was the key to your offseason, you may or may not be able to prevent the Yankees from signing him first. The key to having a universally-praised resume is first building a resume that can be judged. As a result, some bright internetting soul (I forget who) pointed out that a key component of a GM8217s value is the ability to actually make good on their plan. It8217s not enough to intuit that some free agent is a good value 8211 you8217ve got to go out and make the deal, with all that that entails: convincing the player, his agent, maybe your own ownership group, whatever veteran is most at risk of lost playing time, etc. So far, we8217ve been focused on players entering an org, but there8217s something just as critical about how and when players leave it, too. Poor player development results in trading an ex-prospect for pennies on the dollar and watching them develop into Jake Arrieta. Misjudging one8217s own talent leads to disasters like the Erik Bedard trade. Hold onto a struggling player too long, and suddenly your scouts are flinging frozen foods at them on some low-level field, but trading a player after a surprisingly good season or two can result in Josh-Donaldson for some 5th starters and a SS prospect. The result seems like a kind of baseball Anna Karenina principle (great moves are all alike, while bad moves are each bad in their own way), but is really a restating of the principle we just discussed. A GM needs to play for each player8217s possible role, but to have 8211 and enact 8211 contingency plans. Two different Mariner front offices planned on Taijuan Walker becoming an ace. They invested in development, and thanks in large part to Walker8217s ability to learn and adapt to a series of coaches, watched Walker move from ultra-raw talent to a universally-lauded prospect. As they waited for him to assume the mantle of Felix8217s heir apparent, they also at least engaged in some discussions to move Walker (for Justin Upton, perhaps for Yoenis Cespedes, etc.), then decided to hold on to the young righty. Até agora. As you8217ve no doubt heard by now, the M8217s and Diamondbacks kicked off the Holiday weekend last Wednesday when they swapped Tai Walker for SS2B Jean Segura, OF Mitch Haniger, and LHP Zac Curtis. The D-backs sidestepped a horrific free agent pitching market, and got a players who can help them for the medium-to-long term. They also dealt from surprisingly solid middle-infield AND outfield depth. Meanwhile, the M8217s, as expected, addressed two of their key weaknesses for 2017 by netting a starting shortstop and getting a right-handed hitting OF who8217s projected to out-hit Guillermo Heredia and with the potential to clear bars a hell of a lot higher than that. I8217ll admit it: I was one of the guys most intrigued by Taijuan Walker8217s potential, and continually thought he was one mechanical tweak, one adjustment, from becoming a clear 2 or better. It8217s so easy to do considering their numerous missteps, but I wondered if any, er, delays in Walker reaching his potential were due to unforced errors made by the Zduriencik front office. The more time went on, the harder it was to sustain that sort of conspiratorial thinking. The Dipoto regime clearly saw Walker as responsible for his own struggles, as they made the rather stunning move of demoting him for a short while last year. At that point, with a manager and GM who8217d pretty much openly questioned their ace-in-waiting8217s mental toughness, a move like this one comes to seem inevitable. As with the Chris Taylor deal last year, Jerry Dipoto and the M8217s came to view a player who8217d played his way to a lower ultimate ceiling as having more value in trade 8211 even without a mint-conditioned prospect sheen 8211 than they do on the M8217s roster. Unlike that Chris Taylor deal, though, I think Dipoto was able to leverage Walker8217s potential and the historically bad pitching market to make an intriguing deal, one that could make the M8217s much better in 2017. We can quibble with Dipoto8217s handling of Walker, but Walker8217s the guy who gave up 1.81 HR9 last year. Dipoto saw 1) that he needed a shortstop and 2) that Walker was probably not going to be an ace in Seattle anytime soon. Instead of trading him for Zack Cozart, he was able to snag Jean Segura, who posted a 5-WAR season in Arizona, AND get an interesting OF prospect in the process. Walker8217s remaining potential and the paucity of external alternatives mean that the classic arguments about overpaying for a player coming off a career year don8217t apply. Segura8217s got two remaining years of club control and joins an M8217s squad that got all of -1.1 WAR from their SS last year, much of that thanks to the frustrating Ketel Marte, who8217s Arizona8217s puzzle now. Segura8217s Steamer projections look a lot like Walker8217s 8211 about 2.2 WAR. That8217s less than half of his production last year, and that8217s despite a so-so defensive year at 2B (so he got less of a bump in positional value). A 2.2 WAR year adds over 3 wins to the M8217s middle infield, and the M8217s again look to be in a position where three wins would be pretty important. Of course, many observers would take the over on that projection for Segura. This Al Melchior piece at Fanrag (hat tip to Bob Dutton) dives into his peripheral stats and note that Segura8217s power spike seems like the product of sustainable changes in approach rather than luck or a fortuitous home park (he had pretty minor homeroad splits last year). If Segura8217s able to post a 3-4 WAR season, look out. If Safeco8217s as homer-friendly as it was last year, and Segura8217s able to hit 20 bombs again (I have more faith in that than a repeat of his 41 doubles, for the record), the M8217s look like a formidable team, even with a hole in the rotation. To be clear: you can8217t just start with Segura8217s 2016 and work from there. Segura spent all of 2014 and 2015 hitting like Ketel Marte hit in 2016. He had slightly more value thanks to a decent glove and some baserunning success, but at the plate, Segura was utterly lost. It8217s nice to point to changes in approach, or working with a well-respected coach, but there8217s risk here, too. Any projection has to take his entire history into account, and much of that history 8211 even the recent stuff 8211 looks bad. That said, his 2016 counts too. This is the part of the post where we8217d typically look at similar moves 8211 cost-controlled SS2Bs coming off big years that get traded. The problem is that it just doesn8217t happen that often (for obvious reasons). The buy-low adage is still a good one, but it often leads to even-lower production. Cristian Guzman to the Nationals, Yuniesky Betancourt to the Royals (LOL), Ronny CedenoJack Wilsonetc. Players have signed free agent deals after solid years 8211 Marco Scutaro8217s 2-year deal with the Red Sox after a breakout with the Blue Jays comes to mind, or Jose Reyes8217 blockbuster deal with the Marlins 8211 but it8217s just rare to move a decent SS coming off a great year. That makes it hard to judge (is Segura more Brad Miller, Aaron Hill, or Howie Kendrick), but at the very least, there8217s not a clear pattern of similar moves backfiring. It8217s not like there8217s clear evidence that guys who go from 20 runs below average to 20 runs above give all of those gains back again. The inclusion of Mitch Haniger makes the deal even easier to like. Dave Cameron8217s wrap-up of the move spent a great deal of time talking about the young OF, whom many observers think has the glove to play CF long term. Even without that advantage, he8217s projected as a near-league average player in 2017, and he8217d fill perhaps the biggest need the M8217s have. The Mariners pitching depth wasn8217t great, but the drop off from Walker to Karns is a lot smaller than the drop off from Segura to Marte. I don8217t really understand what went on between Walker, Scott Servais and Jerry Dipoto, and I think there8217s still a chance a change of scenery helps him unlock his potential. Those are cliches layered on cliches, I realize, but as much as I8217m disappointed Walker never really 8220happened8221 in Seattle, maybe Walker made the M8217s 4-5 wins better after all. A year ago around this time, Jerry Dipoto traded upside for a rotation upgrade. He did it when he moved Brad Miller for Nathan Karns, and he did it when he traded Roenis Elias and Carson Smith for Wade Miley. Perhaps we need an addendum to the principles we8217ve discussed here: learn from your mistakes. Brad Miller is not, and was not, anything remotely akin to Jean Segura. But a year ago, the M8217s saw reliability in the rotation as a cornerstone value. It didn8217t have a pithy acronym that everyone would say on the broadcast, but it was worth parting with Miller and it was worth trading the most valuable reliever in the org for what seemed like a generic, if reliable (ha), 4. This year, the M8217s had a frustrating but valuable 4, and this year, Dipoto saw the worth of that 8211 the frustration, the possibility, the clear value in 200 IP 8211 differently. (I realize I8217ve given short shrift to Zac Curtis, the lefty reliever the M8217s picked up. I saw his BrooksBaseball page and literally lol8217d. Curtis throws 92, and has a ton of horizontal movement, the byproduct of the exact same low 34 delivery Dipoto8217s sought out throughout organized baseball.) marc w middot November 21, 2016 middot Filed Under Mariners Given the sheer volume of activity during Jerry Dipoto8217s first offseason at the helm of the M8217s front office, it should be much of a surprise that he8217s been busy again this fall. Since my AFL update post, the M8217s have made three fairly interesting trades, added a few players to their 40-man roster, and lost and signed a number of minor league free agents. Let8217s take a look at each of them. 1: The M8217s traded for former OaklandBostonMinnesotaKansas CityBaltimore corner OFIF Danny Valencia, who8217s coming off a solid year at the plate, playing 130 games with a 118 OPS. Valencia8217s always been a lefty-mashing platoon guy he8217s got a career 139 OPS vs lefties, but just 85 against righties. That and some defensive limitations partially explain his availability, and his availability for the bargain-basement price of AA starter Paul Blackburn (the throw-in in the Montgomery for Vogelbach trade this summer). The rest, and perhaps the BULK of the seeming chasm between his value and his price, is that he8217s gathered the reputation of a difficult personality. Valencia slugged 17 HRs last year, but his most noteworthy smash of 2016 was a punch he landed to the face of Oakland DH Billy Butler. He played for two organizations at the big league level in 2012, 2014 and 2015. There8217s essentially zero question about his ability to hit lefties, and his performance against righties has actually been trending upwards in recent years 8211 he was a slightly-above-league-average hitter against them last year. This is an amazing get for the M8217s, especially given Blackburn8217s lack of projection. Personality rumors aside, I don8217t want to oversell the 8220headcase8221 angle. He8217s also going into his third year of arbitration, and will presumably be a free agent after the year. He8217ll get a substantial raise from the 3 million he made last year, and while that8217s not terribly important to the M8217s, it8217s starting to sound like real money to Oakland. His defense has also been an issue. He8217s primarily played 3B, something the M8217s don8217t need him to do. That8217s probably for the best, as UZR and DRS agree that Valencia8217s been a poor defender at the hot corner. He got a few games at 1B for the A8217s last year, and would fit nicely in a platoon with Vogelbach there, but he8217d be a lot more interesting as an OF. The M8217s 1 LF at this point (via the M8217s official depth chart ) is Ben Gamel, a lefty who8217s projected to post a 91 wRC next year. Guillermo Heredia8217s a right-handed alternative with a much better glove, but he8217s projected for an only slightly better 94 wRC mark. Seth Smith is 34, and his defensive marks tumbled last year. There8217s room for someone like Valencia (who8217s 32 himself) to get a look. Right now, the depth chart lists Valencia as the starter at 1B, but given everything the M8217s have said about Vogelbach (and given the M8217s interest in acquiring him), I8217d assume the hefty lefty will get every opportunity to start vs. righties and thus claim the lion8217s share of playing time. Valencia can play 1B, I8217d assume, but he8217d have a bit more value if he could fill in in an OF corner as well. There8217s a surprising amount of risk in his profile: he8217s had several lost years at the plate, he could be a defensive disaster in LF, etc. But this is a great, low-cost move to solidify their batting order and satisfy Dipoto8217s desire to get another RH bat. 2: As good as that trade was, I8217m still scratching my head about the M8217s trading impressive starting pitching prospect Zack Littell for left-handed reliever James Pazos of the Yankees. Littell was an 11th round pick out of a North Carolina high school in 2013, and he8217d moved slowly in his first couple of years in the system. In 2015, something clicked, and he quickly became the only bright spot on a dismal Clinton Lumberkings team. He started in Clinton in 2016, and was even better. A promotion to the California League didn8217t slow him down, and he ended the year as a top-10 prospect for the M8217s (that8217s where I would8217ve put him, anyway). MLB had him as the M8217s 14th best prospect, while mentioning that his FB touches 94. Other reports have him with a bit less velocity, and in any case, Littell hasn8217t been successful thanks to a spectacular FB. He typically sits around 90 with his well-located FB and has a very good slow curve along with it, according to those who8217ve seen him pitch. His calling card is probably his command, as his mediocre stuff plays up, allowing him to post a walk rate below 5 last year while minimizing HRs. He doesn8217t have clear, obvious plus-grade stuff, but this is a pretty good get for the Yankees. In return, the M8217s get a hard-throwing lefty reliever who8217s had intermittent control problems and battled the always-encouraging 8220undisclosed injuries8221 in his minor league tenure. He throws very hard: Brooks measured his average FB last year at 96 MPH, up from 94.5 in 2015. Pazos throws it from a low 34 motion, and it8217s got plenty of armside run. I kind of like the pitch in theory, but big league hitters haven8217t had too much trouble hitting it hard (miniscule sample alert). He8217s been great in the minors, and he seems ready for an opportunity to get more playing time in the bigs, though it8217s perhaps telling that the Yankees are moving him after clearing some space in their bullpen by trading Andrew Miller and Aroldis Chapman. They, like most teams, have plenty of options for the back of the bullpen, so that8217s not a slam on Pazos, but this feels like an overpay by the M8217s because of their stated need to get a lefty reliever. Pazos shouldn8217t have come free 8211 he8217s a lefty with a weird arm angle throwing 96 8211 but I was amazed it took Littell. On the plus side: despite his long tenure in the minors and being drafted out of college, Pazos should still have two options years left. He didn8217t use one in 2015, so he burned the first of three in 2016. If his control goes south again, he can head to Tacoma to refine it. If he8217s working out the kinks in the PCL, though, the trade may seem even more lopsided, however. 3: In a great change-of-scenery trade, the M8217s picked up IFs Richie Shaffer and Taylor Motter from Tampa in exchange for SP prospect Dylan Thompson, RP Andrew Kittredge and 1B Dalton Kelly. Thompson8217s the prize here, as the M8217s went overslot to get him a few years ago in the draft, but he threw just a handful of innings this year, all of them in the Arizona League (he started the championship game, actually). Kittredge, a former UW Husky, has been a long-time M8217s farmhand, working out of the bullpen in Jackson and Tacoma for many years. When the M8217s pulled Thyago Vieira out of the AFL, they replaced him with Kittredge, presumably so the Rays could get a better look at him. He throws a a low-90s FB with a hard, cuttery slider and a slower, big breaking curve. Dalton Kelly was a very late round pick out of UCSB and had a hot start for Clinton, but really tailed off down the stretch. He showed some good bat-to-ball skills, but doesn8217t currently have the power you8217d look for in a 1B. In return the M8217s got a lottery ticket in Richie Shaffer and at least the potential for a super-sub in Taylor Motter. Shaffer was the Rays8217 first-round pick out of Clemson in 2012, but he combined poor power (for a 3B1B) and didn8217t hit for average. He8217s shown the ability to work a walk (you can tell why Dipoto was interested), but hadn8217t really gotten his BP power to show up in games. That changed in 2015, when he knocked 26 HRs and worked his way from AA to MLB. While his walk rate stayed high, his K rate crept up at each level, and that8217s been a huge problem in his two cups of coffee in Tampa. Without any development, he8217s a useful piece for Tacoma, as a 8220Mike Zunino8217s skillset minus the catching parts8221 isn8217t playable, but while his odds of breaking out aren8217t great, he8217s shown he8217s capable of driving the ball. Will working with Edgar unlock some latent ability I8217m not wagering any money on it, but his odds are better than your average waiver-wire find. Taylor Motter has always hit remarkably well for a guy who8217s always had the 82204th OF 8221 or utility man tag slapped on him. A 17th rounder out of not-yet-national-power Coastal Carolina, Motter combined decent speed with a solid eye and contact skills to post solidly above-average batting lines throughout the minors. He played all over the diamond, logging most of his time at 3B and RF, but getting quite a few games at SS, 2B and CF. Motter8217s older and right-handed, but there8217s some Ben Gamel in is approach at the plate: both have a decent eye, don8217t hit for a lot of power (Gamel8217s 2 years younger, to be fair), and after some solid seasons in the upper minors, both got steamrolled by the American League last year. Gamel8217s projected to do a bit better next year, but Motter had the superior MiLB lines and didn8217t crash quite as badly as Gamel. In terms of his, uh, utility to the M8217s, the clear comp for Motter is Shawn O8217Malley, a guy who can play all over and not embarrass himself, and hit enough to justify a roster spot, particularly given today8217s short benches that put a premium on positional flexibility. Motter appears to be a top-shelf version of O8217Malley (who, like Motter, was drafted by the Rays), with a bit more upside at the plate, but without the switch-hitting ability. O8217Malley8217s the better defender at SS, but Motter8217s got more upside than most utility guys. 4: So, I mentioned it above, but just after I wrote about Vieira, the M8217s removed him from the Peoria roster, replacing him with Andrew Kittredge. You can understand the thought process: the deadline for the M8217s to roster was fast approaching, and they had one last chance to see him face decent competition. Vieira responded by throwing 102 with decent control, and thus the decision didn8217t turn out to be that difficult: the M8217s added Vieira to the 40-man, and then shut him down to avoid the risk of injury. Joining Vieira on the MLB roster were left-handed reliever Paul Fry and 1BDH DJ Peterson, the club8217s first round pick in 2013. Peterson had some injury issues in 2016, but on the whole, he performed far better than his atrocious 2015. At this point, I8217m not sure he8217s ever going to hit for average, but he8217s demonstrated in-game power in the upper minors, and could tap into more after some work with the M8217s coaches. Paul Fry could be a LOOGY for the M8217s next year, a possibility Dipoto mentioned to Ryan Divish the other day. He posted a nice ERA, though a high walk rate and plenty of un-earned runs make that a bit misleading. Making room on the roster were Tom Wilhelmsen, who8217s now a free agent, and Stefen Romero, who8217ll ply his trade in Japan next year. LH RP David Rollins, the M8217s last Rule 5 pick (2014), was claimed by the Cubs off of waivers. Speaking of the Rule 5 draft, by adding Vieira, Fry and Peterson, the M8217s 40-man roster is now full, so it doesn8217t look like they can play in the MLB portion of the Rule 5 on December 8th. In fact, the M8217s are already facing a roster crunch: CF Boog Powell is currently on the restricted list following his PED suspension, so while he8217d been on the 40-man, his spot doesn8217t officially 8220count8221 until he serves his time. At that point, the M8217s are going to have to make a move to either keep Powell or try to slip him through waivers. Powell8217s currently playing in the Dominican League, where he8217s posting his customary solid OBP, but, sadly, a sub-.300 SLG. Hey, better than Taylor Motter who8217s 0-18 in the Dominican. 5: The M8217s signed a few minor league free agents, grabbing RP Peter Tago who8217d last been in the White Sox org. Tago had been with the White Sox, where he showed solid bat-missing ability, and elite-level strike-zone-missing ability. They also signed Blake Perry, a right-hander who8217d played his entire pro career (dating back to the 2010 draft) in the D-Backs organization. They even re-signed Steve Baron, whom they bumped from the 40-man roster a few weeks ago. The M8217s have lost a few farmhands as well, with Venezuelan righty Osmer Morales signing with the Angels and 2016 Tacoma starter Kraig Sitton signed with Colorado. 6: At this point, the M8217s have made a number of small moves that, taken together, make the 2017 club a bit better at the expense of some low-minors pitching depth. That sounds like an unalloyed good thing, and I suppose it8217s not bad, but if you8217re going to play for 2017 8211 and let8217s be clear: they absolutely should 8211 then they need to take a decisive step instead of tinkering with the 11-13th reliever on the active roster. The M8217s SS position is a problem, and they8217re actively working to upgrade it, either with Cincinnati8217s Zach Cozart or someone else. Ketel Marte needs more seasoning, more ABs8230something. But the M8217s OF is a bigger, more complicated problem. They have 5 rostered OFs (6, including Powell), and only Seth Smith 8211 who8217ll turn 35 next year 8211 is projected to be league average at the plate. Leonys Martin8217s 2nd half swoon makes his projection of an 82 wRC a bit more plausible, and Gamel and Heredia8217s sub-100 projections seem fair, too. Shawn O8217Malley isn8217t on the roster to be a league-average bat, and if Motter impresses, he may not be on the roster at all. Sure, use Danny Valencia out there, but that makes it less likely that they improve on their -40 defensive runs last year, and you also can8217t use him at 1B. You can hope Gamel and Heredia make strides, but the whole 8220he hasn8217t shown it yet, but I swear it8217s coming,8221 thing is what sunk the Zduriencik administration. I8217m preaching to the choir, and the M8217s know this as well as anyone. This is not the OF that the M8217s will enter the regular season with. But with all of the talk about the SS position, the M8217s have lots to do with their outfield. I kind of imagine the A8217s making the deal without really knowing who they were getting. 8220We8217re interested in Valencia8221 8220SURE, no problem. We can make this work.8221 8220Ok, you want pitching8221 8220Yes. Or hitting.8221 8220We8217ve got a lefty in AA who ca8221 8220Done. Sounds great. I8217ll start the paperwork.8221